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On 26 February 1908 Walter Leitch, the mine manager of a small private 
West Coast mine employing about 160 workers, dismissed seven miners, all 
members of the recently formed Blackball branch of the Socialist Party. The 
miners had been agitating for some time for an eight hour ‘bank to bank’ 
day, that is for overtime to be paid if a miner worked longer than eight hours 
from the time he entered a mine to the time he left the mine.2 Tensions had 
been inflamed by a second local union demand for half an hour rather than 
fifteen minutes for lunch or crib. The Blackball Miners’ Industrial Union 
of Workers struck the next day when management refused to reinstate and 
compensate the sacked workers. The Blackball strike, famously known as 
the ‘crib’ or ‘tucker time’ strike, lasted 11 weeks, ending on 13 May 1908 
when the Blackball Coal Mining Company (Limited) reinstated the men 
and the mealtime was increased to thirty minutes.3
 The Blackball strike in 1908 focused national attention on the arbitration 
system. Conservatives were enraged by the apparent victory of the miners 
in the ‘Blackball affair’.4 The Arbitration Court of New Zealand fined the 
miners’ union £75 for striking in defiance of the Arbitration Act. The union 
had no assets and so each miner was liable to a fine up to £10. The miners 
refused to pay any such fines, and an auction of confiscated miners’ goods 
was an embarrassing failure. Radicals were encouraged by the strike’s 
achievements and went on to form the New Zealand Federation of Miners 
in Greymouth in August 1908 and to hold their first national conference in 
Wellington two months later.5 The Miners’ Federation changed its name in 
1909 to the New Zealand Federation of Labour or, as it was more commonly 
known, the ‘Red Feds’. Watersiders’, general labourers’, shearers’, and other, 
mainly unskilled, unions, representing a quarter of organised workers, 
affiliated to the federation over four years. The federation was successful in 
convincing a number of these unions to cancel their registration under the 
Arbitration Act. Militant industrial union policies begun in 1908 culminated 
in the 1913 Great Strike.6 The 1908 strike is widely held to signal the start 
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of the rise of industrial unionism in New Zealand; some relate the strike 
in 1908 to the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in 1916 and the 
Labour electoral victory in 1935.7
 Historians have not neglected the 1908 Blackball Strike: the shifting 
current of historical discourse has drawn with it this relatively small strike. 
New Zealand historians once analyzed 1908, as they did most strikes, in 
terms of a division of the labour movement into moderates and militants.8 
Writing on the strike in the past century first concentrated on the militants 
or ‘Red Feds’ in the making. Undermining the moderate/militant dichotomy, 
historians then began to examine moderate labour, Independent Labour and 
Liberal-Labour factions.9 Most recently, the perspective of urban radicals has 
been considered, especially that offered by J.A. (Jack) McCullough, Workers’ 
Representative on the Arbitration Court, a socialist but not a Red Fed, who 
also attempted to mediate in the Blackball dispute outside his court role.10
 The historiography on the Blackball strike, as it reproduces the broader 
pattern of labour history, similarly reveals shared weaknesses in its fabric. 
Examining the 1908 Blackball Strike from McCullough’s perspective draws 
our attention to three aspects that still need more work. We need to pay more 
attention to the range of radical voices. Terms such as ‘socialist’ need to be 
unpacked and analyzed to explore the diversity of perspectives within the 
labour movement before the first World War.11 We need to better understand 
the employer dynamics, or the history of the ‘right’, in New Zealand labour 
history.12 The wider social and cultural issues behind the success of the Red 
Feds at Blackball – and the limits of their appeal – have been neglected. 
Finally, women’s experience needs to be considered.13 Few would disagree 
with these points. While calls for work in these areas of labour history have 
been made elsewhere, they are well worth reiterating, specifically in regard 
to the Blackball Strike. One might think that the Blackball strike has been 
thoroughly considered, but the inclusion of McCullough’s perspective draws 
our attention to aspects still neglected.
 The Blackball Strike is a useful case study for considering the socialists 
who did not support strike action, the history of the ‘right’ and the role of 
working-class women in New Zealand in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. The ‘representation’ approach to social history is popular. It is 
based on the view that the best explanations are ones that consider all 
actors’ perspectives whether based on class, race, gender or ethnicity. The 
theory appeals, but the evidence eludes. Despite new work on Blackball, the 
lack of evidence limits what we can discover, especially regarding women’s 
experience. Revisiting Blackball and its historiography on its centenary 
encourages theoretical reflection and exploring points of view neglected in 
the history. In this paper, I plumb the prospects provided by considering 
Blackball from the perspective of socialist urban labour. I also consider the 
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limits of this approach. Revisiting Blackball thus encourages us to think 
about future research strategies.
The existing historiography
The first accounts interpreting the 1908 strike were published in newspapers 
from April 1908.14 Some memoirs were written in the interwar period.15 
For their part, historians have shown a continuing interest in the Blackball 
strike from the second World War, first concentrating on the miners, politics 
and ideology. Taken as a whole, there is a big divide, thereafter, in the 
historiography between work, on the one hand, by W.B. (Bill) Sutch, P.J. (Pat) 
O’Farrell and Erik Olssen – concentrating on the Red Feds – and, on the 
other, by Len Richardson and, most recently, Brian Wood, who consider the 
broader community.16 All are social labour historians, interested in ‘history 
from below’ or the political movement of the masses and, increasingly, 
in what hindered the movement. There is also increasing interest in all 
the constituent parts making up ‘the masses’ and the consequent social 
relationships.
 The first sustained analysis of 1908 was Sutch’s Poverty and Progress 
in New Zealand, published in 1941.17 He was concerned with a national 
narrative and explaining how the Liberals came to lose their popularity 
amongst working people. He argued that the Liberals’ legislation rested on 
a moment of prosperity in New Zealand’s history ‘caused by rising export 
prices and the change in New Zealand’s economy from large-scale wool 
producing and manufacturing based on sweated wages to more intensive 
farming, producing not only wool but lamb, mutton, beef, butter and cheese 
for export’.18 The Boer War and Australia’s drought helped too. Then the 
prosperous moment passed, the legislation dried up and discontent mounted. 
So Sutch emphasises the ‘comparative mild depression of 1907’ which 
‘made for a clearer realization that the workers had nothing to gain from 
the Arbitration Court’.19 The economic and material conditions were tinder 
dry, and the socialists were the spark.
 The socialists were a small group of miners touched by the international 
industrial moment. The problem with Sutch’s analysis is the classic ‘moderate 
and militant’ model.20 He argues that the Independent Labour League was 
not socialist.21 He defines socialism as those joining the Socialist Party 
formed in 1901. Kerry Taylor has shown, however, that even within that group 
there were those supporting the parliamentary strategy.22 Sutch mentions 
that there was argument among the socialists over parliamentary action, 
but the emphasis in the chapter is that the rest of the labour movement was 
moderate.23 He assumes the Independent Political Labour League contained 
no socialists who might be arguing over strike action. Rather, they were 
‘craft unionists’.
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 O’Farrell concentrates on the socialists, describing the miner leaders, 
Pat Hickey, Bob Semple and Paddy Webb, as ‘consummate opportunists’.24 
He argued that ‘the Grey coal mining district, with its potentially militant 
workers, was merely a first favourable base for agitators with national 
ambitions’.25 They built the Runanga Miners’ Hall and got the Westland 
Trades and Labour Council to appoint an organising secretary of labour for 
the West Coast.26 The socialist leaders, a ‘social vanguard’ chose Blackball to 
plan, organise and provoke a miners’ strike. Blackball was a microcosm of 
the ‘classic Marxist technique with “the most advanced and resolute section” 
of the working class asserting its historical role’.27 Blackball was ‘an isolated 
and dreary township with a population of about 500’, and in such a dull 
place ‘concerted socialist descent on the normally quiet township amounted 
to a sensation’.28 They converted 30 or 40 of the 130 Blackball miners – that 
is, less than a third – to socialism. ‘Not many of the miners were socialists’, 
but all were hostile to the 15-minute crib. The ‘doctrinaire’ socialist leaders’ 
‘tactics were shrewd and simple – exploitation of an existing grievance to 
call upon the basic and traditional union precept, solidarity’.29 They used 
Blackball and moved on to bigger soapboxes. They were successful because 
of a general context of ‘dissatisfaction with gains made under arbitration 
and of an increasing local confidence engendered by rising prosperity’ after 
1905 on the coalfields.30 O’Farrell is aware of the Red Feds’ organisational 
and propaganda skills; he concentrates on them rather than on those who 
were ‘taken in’.
 Olssen is concerned with the national story of the rise of labour, regarding 
1908 as the direct ancestor not only of the 1912 Waihi and the 1913 Great 
Strikes, but also of the formation of the New Zealand Labour Party in 
1916 and of the election of a Labour government in 1935. He concentrates 
on the Red Feds, offering a cultural explanation of how they cultivated a 
growing community. In the beginning, the socialists ‘appealed mainly to the 
politically minded transients, the frustrated outsiders, who had strong views 
but no power’.31 The coal miners had become ‘volatile’. Olssen emphasises 
the ‘large number of young and single transient miners’.32 They had been 
roused by experienced overseas agitators from Australia, by Ben Tillett from 
England and by H.M. Fitzgerald from Canada. Unlike Sutch and O’Farrell, 
however, Olssen considers the social conditions at Blackball in more detail 
as a backdrop to explaining the success of the industrial socialists. He 
emphasises three issues. First, the years between 1900 and 1906 might 
have been prosperous years nationally, but they had been hard for the 
miners, their families and the company, with irregular work and coal orders. 
Second, the miners had ongoing concerns. The wooden tubs used to weigh 
their coal at the mine mouth had lost weight owing to a dry spell, and the 
miners believed (correctly as it transpired) that they were being underpaid. 
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They also believed the mine was inadequately ventilated. The issue of a 
half-hour crib time was, then, just one of their concerns. Finally, there was 
a more general discontent among the miners: the ‘bank to bank issue’ or 
the eight-hour day. The Liberals had passed the Coal Mines Act of 1902 
limiting a miner’s working day to eight hours, a day that included traveling 
from the mine entrance to the coalface. Unfortunately, the relationship 
between the law and reality was not direct. The Arbitration Court provided 
overtime rates for traveling, but it did not automatically enshrine eight-hour 
working days in the legal awards negotiated and set down under its aegis. 
The Blackball strike was about the company’s desire to operate an aerial 
tramway resulting in a ten-hour day, which would flout the bank-to-bank 
provision in the Act.
 Olssen, like O’Farrell before him, takes to task the interpretations of 
the Blackball strike that ‘imply that the miners left the arbitration system 
in droves’.33 After all, the Blackball miners themselves did not leave the 
Arbitration Court until 1910. Moreover, some Red Fed leaders, like Mark 
Fagan and the Inangahua Miners’ Union, supported arbitration without 
pause. Olssen also notes that there were ‘conflicting claims of class and 
geographic community’ and between ‘socialism and liberalism’.34 However, 
Olssen concentrates on ‘the spokesmen for the new spirit of truculence’ 
rather than the opponents of industrial unionism.
 Richardson picks up the threads of others.35 For instance, by 1975, 
O’Farrell had accepted that British socialism was as important as Australian 
and United States socialism in the Grey Valley. The ‘first socialist 
organizations in New Zealand were strongly British in orientation’, advocating 
a ‘mild and vague co-operative socialism’, like the Socialist Church and 
the Wellington Socialist League in 1897 and later the Clarion socialists, 
whose aim was a ‘co-operative commonwealth’.36 Richardson notes the 
‘English bias both in personnel and doctrine’ and further explores the range 
of socialisms evident at Blackball, the two different streams. Sutch argues 
that the arbitrationists were soon defeated, but Richardson suggests it was 
not quite so straightforward.37 Like Olssen, he notes that Semple spoke the 
socialist rhetoric while remaining a pragmatist.38
 Richardson’s main point, however, is that the strike was a cultural 
phenomenon rather than a matter of political ideology. He is much less 
concerned with the national political story than with the history of 
mineworkers from 1880 to 1960. Rather than highlighting new men, new 
politics and new ideologies, he points to the long history of radicalism and 
how it fared after Blackball. Consequently, he emphasises, like those before 
him, the demand for bank-to-bank provisions, the need for pensions, the 
demand for direct representation of miners on public bodies that bore directly 
on the operation of the coal industry and so on. In addition, he concentrates 
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on the housing conditions of the miners and the conditions in communities 
that grew too quickly as things on the coast had done since the gold rushes. 
He points to the expectations that a state coalmine at Runanga had fed and 
how both miners and government were disappointed, and the effect of the 
economic uncertainty on mining communities. He considers the lack of safety 
in the mines, the poor sanitation, the prevalence of miner’s phthisis and the 
miners’ demands to be involved in mine inspection. The Blackball miners 
were ‘hard-nosed men’ who were not seduced by ‘the verbal pyrotechnics 
of ideologues’.39 They steadfastly pursued reform in the workplace or ‘pit 
radicalism’. Similarly, Wood considers the pit radicalism of the miners at 
Blackball, more specifically beginning with the formation of the Black Ball 
Creek Coal Company in 1885, and, in Richardson’s wake, concentrating on 
the environment and the miners’ working and social conditions.40
 We can take Richardson and Wood’s perspective further still. One 
source used extensively by both authors is the diary of Jack McCullough, 
Workers’ Representative on the Arbitration Court, 1907–1921.41 McCullough’s 
experience raises important further issues about the divisions among 
socialists and the nature of New Zealand society, the role of the employers 
in the dispute and the issues to do with community and how we approach 
strikes.
Pro-arbitration Socialists and the Blackball Strike 1908
J. McCullough was a socialist. He had been baptised in the font of the 
Sinclair Seamen’s Church in Belfast and apprenticed in the craft unionism 
of the Liverpool smiths. In New Zealand from 1880, he made his mark as 
an activist in the Socialist Church speaking on a soapbox in Christchurch 
Cathedral Square on Sundays with Harry Atkinson. Over time he became 
an atheist and pacifist. The ‘Irish-born railways tinsmith’ McCullough ‘may 
justly be regarded as the single most influential figure in Christchurch 
socialism of the period’.42 He was the ‘chief organizer’ in Christchurch of 
first the Socialist Party in 1901; then the Political Labour League (PLL) 
1904, which became the Independent Political Labour League (IPLL) by 
1905; then the first ‘moderate’ Labour Party in 1910 and finally the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) from 1913.43 He joined the New Zealand Labour 
Party in 1916 and stood as a Labour Party candidate in 1922. McCullough 
chaired the revival meeting of the Christchurch Socialist Party in 1932, just 
as he had chaired its inaugural meetings in 1902.44 He was loathe to leave 
the Socialist Party in 1904, but he decided to support the IPLL because it 
was ‘independent’, that is it was not associated with existing parties and 
might facilitate solidarity in a way that organisations affiliated with warring 
factions could not.45
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 McCullough’s experience of the 1908 Blackball Strike shows that at the 
time there were a range of views of the strike and arbitration, even among 
socialists. McCullough’s faction supported the Arbitration Court through the 
period 1908–1913. As O’Farrell pointed out as early as 1959, most of the 
miners were not militant socialists, and most workers continued to support 
arbitration throughout the period. Thus, a pro-arbitration socialist who was 
involved in the aftermath of the Blackball strike offers a different perspective 
on the strike.
 What was McCullough’s experience? McCullough was well aware of the 
increasing criticism of the Arbitration Court throughout the union movement 
at the time of his election to the position of workers’ representative on the 
court in late 1907. For a decade, overseas visitors had publicised their opinion 
that compulsory arbitration had restrained the New Zealand union movement. 
McCullough had had a few hours’ private conversation with Sydney and 
Beatrice Webb, for instance, who made it clear that they did not believe that 
the progressive legislation in New Zealand had improved the wage workers’ 
lot. Rather, the union movement’s acquiescence in compulsory arbitration 
was a sad reflection on the ideological and political backward ness of New 
Zealand workers.46 British workers never relinquished their independence by 
submitting to compulsory unionism. McCullough noted that after 1906, New 
Zealand unionists started to echo criticisms by overseas visitors. Increasingly, 
industrial unionists were also critical of compulsory arbitration.
 In 1908 a motion calling on the Westland Trades and Labour Council to 
proclaim it had no confidence in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act was narrowly defeated by a casting vote.47 Unionists criticised the 
Arbitration Court because it gave ‘unlimited power to the employers, while 
it limits the power of the workers’. It was noted that in the old country 
workers would have nothing to do with compulsory arbitration. Even the 
moderate Ramsay MacDonald had condemned it. Bob Semple, an Australian 
immigrant and rising miners’ leader, forcibly argued that an arbitration 
court would not be needed in a just society. The arbitration court was a 
poor expedient that had failed in New South Wales, and it was failing in 
New Zealand. This verdict was substantiated by the Granity Union’s award 
hearing in December l907.48 William A. Sim, Judge of the Arbitration Court, 
offered the workers ‘no hope’ after telling the Granity Union that he would 
not listen to them ‘on cost of living, profits or nature of work’.
 It was with a great deal of trepidation that McCullough went to Greymouth 
two days after the historic Westland Trades and Labour Council meeting to 
hear a case against the Blackball miners.49 He knew the mood of the miners, 
who had struck over the dismissal of seven unionists who they contended 
were being victimised for leading the campaign to extend the crib time from 
fifteen to thirty minutes.50 The mine manager, W. (‘Boko’) Leitch, maintained 
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that he had to reduce the underground workforce to restrict the mined coal 
to a volume that could be moved in only eight hours, since the union had 
refused to allow truckers to move coal for ten hours.51 McCullough met 
with Hickey, Rogers, Secretary Fox, the Vice President, and others: ‘They 
agreed with me that there had been a strike and that I could not prevent a 
fine being inflicted.’52 He negotiated with the employers ‘for a return to the 
10 hour system of running the ariel tram, 1/2 hour crib and definite promise 
to reinstate all the dismissed men and not to victimise or discriminate in 
the future’.53
 The day after hearing the case on 11 March, the court issued its decision, 
criticising both parties to the dispute. It was observed that mine manager 
Leitch, by peremptorily dismissing the seven particular unionists, could 
not have done more to bring about a crisis between the union and the 
company. The court suspected Leitch had deliberately selected the seven 
men for sacking because he believed they were leading the ‘trouble’ about 
both the crib time and the reduction of the truckers’ hours. On the other 
hand, Sim maintained that the high-handed and arbitrary manner in which 
the union attempted to increase the crib time, with less than twenty-four 
hours’ notice to Leitch, was inexcusable. Moreover, the union appear ed to 
shun peacemakers who attempted to conciliate in the dis pute.54 The final 
analysis convicted the union of striking in defiance of the existing industrial 
law. Judge Sim’s declaration that ‘in view of all the circumstances we have 
decided to impose a fine of £75’, veils the dispute that went on behind 
closed doors between the three members of the court in committee. Since 
he could not guarantee that the miners would go back to work, McCullough 
reluctantly agreed they had to be fined by the court for striking, but argued 
that £25 was sufficient. In contrast, Brown, the employers’ representative, 
demanded the maximum of £100, and the Judge ‘compromised’ at £75.55 
McCullough declared that he could not get less than a £75 fine because 
‘I could not definitely assure his honour that the men would decide to return 
to work’.56
 McCullough publicly appeared to be an ardent defender of arbitration, 
criticising the radical miners. This view, that McCullough was unsympathetic 
to the miners, has been captured in Beardsley’s novel, Blackball ’08: ‘He’d 
always been a moderate, always would be, but he’d seen the moderate unions 
clobbered pretty hard recently by the court, the court that was supposed to 
aid and protect them. And it was this, more than anything else, that was 
causing militancy among the unions, especially those in essential industries, 
like mining. But if they were militant, they were still unions and you had 
to do what you could for them – within the law, anyway.’57
 Privately, McCullough attempted to act as a peacemaker in the Blackball 
dispute. He drew up terms and arranged a conference between the parties. 
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He also met a small group of the unionists. Far from sharing a passionate 
solidarity, as suggested in the Arbitration Court hearing in Greymouth, 
the twenty-one men were almost evenly divided. ‘The union’ accepted 
McCullough’s terms, but, as Hickey later told him, decided only by a narrow 
majority to go back to work. Paddy Webb congratulated McCullough and 
prominent miners for producing a settlement. The next morning, McCullough 
discovered that both sides had reneged on the agreement. He assumed, in 
the beginning, that it was a case of the militants pressuring their mates, and 
he bitterly deplored the ‘undemocratic manipulating’ of a genuine grievance 
by both sides. ‘If it is ever my privilege to assist in similar proceedings’, he 
vowed, ‘I will not be innocent enough to trust the word of honour or the 
memory of either side.’58 Immediately upon his return to Christchurch, the 
Blackball Coal Company sent a representative to wait on McCullough to try 
to get him to continue to act as a mediator.59 A meeting was arranged for 
him with G.G. Stead, an Addington coal and grain merchant and a major 
shareholder in the Blackball Coal Company. Stead assured McCullough that 
he had forwarded instructions to Leitch, the mine manager, to give the men 
a half-hour crib, the issue over which they had ostensibly struck. He also 
told McCullough that the reason negotiations had ended was because Leitch 
would not see his way to making any compromises at the worksite for the 
sake of peace.60 McCullough knew that James Isdell, the local Greymouth 
Labour Department Office official, and bigger guns, including John A. Millar 
and E. Tregear, had also tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a settlement.
 McCullough gradually became convinced that conciliation in the 
coalmining industry was impossible. The main reason was the ‘vindictiveness 
on the part of the employers of labour on the West Coast’.61 For over a 
month McCullough was involved in negotiations between the union and 
the employers; a code of words was used to prevent the media publishing 
the details of the negotiations. McCullough acted as the go -between. He 
informed the union that Stead was prepared to pay half its court fine and 
arranged for Dave Pritchard, a union spokesman, to meet Stead after the 
Minister of Labour refused to talk to the unionists. He even personally 
travelled to Blackball to induce the men to write ‘courteously’ in reply to 
Stead’s offer ‘even though he was a capitalist’. Finally, he tried to persuade 
the miners to compromise in their demand to reduce truckers’ hours.
 McCullough’s efforts met a brick wall in the employers. William Scott, 
secretary of the Otago Employers’ Association (OEA), informed William 
Pryor, president of the New Zealand Employers’ Federation, at the collapse 
of negotiations that confidences had been broken so often by outsiders, 
including the Minister of Labour and the media, that it had been decided to 
stop all negotiations and remain both firm and silent.62 Indeed, Stead asked 
McCullough not to publish any correspondence between them, particularly 
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his offer to pay the miners’ fine, for fear that it might be misconstrued.63 The 
employers had become angry: Pryor suggested that the miners be imprisoned, 
and Stead suggested to Scott that they should be disenfranchised. For his 
part, Stead proclaimed that he would never have any confidence in future 
arrangements with the miners.64 McCullough quietly took note of the threats 
the angry employers made against the West Coast miners. None of them 
augured well for the future of arbitration.
 The Blackball affair also highlighted McCullough’s dilemma on the 
court. How, as a supporter of the court in principle, could he appropriately 
protest at decisions he disagreed with? He publicly dissented in eleven 
cases in two years, less than 1% of all court decisions or approximately 
6% of all award decisions. There were three major issues during 1908 and 
1909 which sorely tested McCullough’s commitment to the court: the strike 
clause; wages and hours; and the exemption of certain industrial sectors from 
the arbitration system.65 In nearly every dispute the court heard, however, 
McCullough wrote privately to the union secretaries concerned, making it 
clear that he did not really agree with the decision and had fought it most 
strenuously in committee but that he could not publicly dissent for the sake 
of the continuance of the institution.66 McCullough withstood a great deal 
of pressure from his old union mates to publicly dissent from decisions 
of the court he disagreed with. In his view, it was not the court’s duty to 
introduce repressive legislation. He also argued that a number of arbitration 
decisions made the task of his faction in the labour movement, a faction 
that supported arbitration in principle, more difficult.
 The officials of the Red Federation were more ambivalent towards political 
action than is generally assumed. Moreover, while clearly against arbitration, 
the militant socialists did not oppose collective agreements. The Red Feds 
did not generally deliver on their rhetoric of tearing up agreements with 
employers, a tactic McCullough described as showing the ethics of a boa 
constrictor.67 There was considerable argument within the Red Fed ranks 
over tactics, particularly between officials such as Semple and Fagan. Few 
realised the internal divisions in the Red Fed executive. As Ted Howard 
explained later: ‘We quarrelled; we fought for hours and hours, but when 
we came forth from that executive meeting we stood as one man, abiding 
loyally by the will of the majority. That is why the FOL did things.’68 There 
was a discrepancy between the official propaganda of the Maoriland Worker, 
which reached its crescendo in Hickey’s ‘no compromise’ articles, and the 
settlements the ‘Red Feds’ made with employers.69 In fact, the militant miners 
were resorting to the fullest extent to the use of collective agreements: the 
so-called revolutionaries made practical demands for higher wages, shorter 
hours of work and improved job conditions.
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 McCullough was more ambivalent in his attitude toward the Red Feds 
than is usually assumed, too. Like many other pro-arbitration unionists, he 
found the propaganda of the Maoriland Worker repugnant. He rescinded 
his earlier advice to the editor of the Weekly Herald not to wield a poison 
pen.70 In a counterattack, he protested that the Red Feds in New Zealand 
were treating Marxist theory as dogma. Industrial unionists read nothing 
but ‘literature of the De Leon type’, a reference to Daniel De Leon, who 
founded the Marxist Socialist Labor Party of America in 1890.71 Hickey, 
of course, had sojourned in America and participated in the revolutionary 
Western Federation of Miners. McCullough opined that the Red Feds had 
‘discovered a new and infallible method of industrial organisation that cannot 
fail and so enthusiastic are these persons that even failure will not convince 
them’.72
 McCullough believed in the materialist conception of history. The 
materialist view was a ‘legitimate and necessary’ argument he himself used, 
but he protested that the the Red Fed would not win converts by attacking 
the ethical basis of socialism: ‘to preach exclusively the economic basis is, 
to put it mildly, short-sighted, and unity, the ideal of universal love and 
Brotherhood, will never be built upon selfishness’.73 Sectional and universal 
strikes were, in his view, occasionally necessary, but socialists should aim 
to convince rather than coerce the majority of New Zealanders.74
 The division between McCullough and the miners, typified by Semple, 
resulted as much from a personality clash and different experiences as 
from a theoretical rift. On the strength of a short acquaintance McCullough 
decided Semple’s aggressiveness was deleterious: ‘His combativeness if 
not its earnestness will prevent him being as useful as he should, nay it is 
possible it may be as bad as to make him a decided hindrance to progress 
in the direction of solidarity.’75 By taking Jack McCullough, a man who 
had qualms about shooting rabbits, to a boxing match, Semple highlighted 
the disjunction of their temperaments. McCullough’s reaction was to see 
all ‘the devil there is in poor human nature’ displayed by competitors and 
audience alike. He viewed the miner’s pugnaciousness in a similar light.
 While older Trades and Labour Council men like McCullough found 
the miners’ resolve and combativeness intimidating, the miners felt they 
were being cold-shouldered by a group of men who had no fight left in 
them. They had reason to feel they were outsiders, as McCullough noted: 
‘My blood has boiled within me as I have listened to the wild and mad 
denunciating of men in the movement whose honesty and self-sacrifice I 
have proven again and again. This often by men scarcely in the country.’76 
Not surprisingly, the miners showed little sympathy for New Zealand’s 
industrial history. At the unity meeting McCullough chaired between the 
Red Federation and the Trades and Labour Council executives in August 
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1910, for example, Webb accused the Trades and Labour Council officials 
of negligence: ‘We have devoted our whole time to the education of our 
class. If the Trades Council would arrange meetings for miles and miles 
out, 20 or 30 miles out of Christchurch the same way as we have been 
doing get on old bikes and go round spreading the truth then they would 
be doing a great deal towards building up an organisation.’77 Ironically, in 
the time-consuming task known as ‘plough-chasing’, McCullough and his 
socialist friends Jimmy Thorn and Bob Whiting had been on their old bikes 
interviewing workers as organisers of the Farm Labourers Union before 
many of the miners’ leaders had arrived in New Zealand.
 The issue of arbitration was never settled. Other issues, such as unity, 
assumed a greater importance. Thus, at the July 1911 Unity Conference, the 
resolution to strike out the IWW (Industrial Workers of the World) preamble 
opened old sores. The preamble declared that trade unions assisted employers 
by convincing the working class that it and the employers had common 
interests; whereas, really the ‘working class and the employing class have 
nothing in common’. McCullough, representing the Fabian Society, was 
blamed for the preamble’s excision: ‘Poor Bob Semple, Holland and Fraser 
accused me of being responsible for the defeat [of the IWW preamble] 
and was very wild because they declared I had intro duced the question of 
arbitration vs. strike policy.’78
 Thus, the Blackball miners were not alone in lacking unity in their 
attitudes and objectives. The avowed socialists themselves were far from 
united. The first socialist organisations were formed in New Zealand in 
the mid 1890s. Each of the four main centres had a different character, 
following disparately the ideas of Robert Owen and the Owenite co-operative 
movement, William Blake, William Morris and Robert Blatchford rather 
than those of Karl Marx.79 The Socialist League of Wellington was initiated 
in 1897 during a visit by British socialist trade unionist Ben Tillett.80 
Its numbers were augmented by some 190 Clarion immigrants in 1900, 
galvanised by William Ranstead’s glowing reports in the Clarion newspaper 
of the prospects for working people in New Zealand.81 The Clarionettes were 
largely behind the formation of the New Zealand Socialist Party, formed 
in Wellington during July 1901.82 Branches of the party were soon formed 
in Auckland, Christchurch and many smaller centres.83 The first socialist 
newspaper, however, was founded in 1897 by Atkinson, together with his 
good friend, McCullough, in Christchurch.84 Atkinson had been heavily 
involved with John Trevor and the British Labour Church; he had worked 
on the church’s paper, the Labour Prophet. The New Zealand Socialist 
Church similarly rested on a foundation of ethical socialism.85 Kerry Taylor 
estimates that there was a collective membership of only about 250 socialists 
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in 1900, later boosted by the Clarionettes.86 The first national conference of 
the NZSP convened in 1908.
 Valerie Smith, analysing the great diversity of the early socialist movement, 
aptly described it as a ‘truly chameleon creature’.87 Similarly, Kerry Taylor 
identifies at least three competing visions of revolution amongst socialists 
between 1906 and 1913.88 One attached equal weight to the twin pillars 
of revolutionary politics and industrial unionism; another, the syndicalist 
strand, opposed political action; and a third emphasised a purely political 
orientation, with revolutionary political action leading to the return of ‘class-
conscious Marxian Socialists’ to parliament.89 This view of the diversity 
of socialism has yet to come through the discussions of the strike and 
anti-arbitration movement of New Zealand that Blackball personifies. Nor 
has there been much interest in the constantly shifting alliances; by 1914 
Semple and McCullough were taking tea together and working in the same 
organisation.90
Employers and the Blackball Strike
While there is writing on workers, however critical one is about it, work on 
the mine owners or employers has appeared only recently.91 Historians are 
slowly beginning to consider the development of employers’ organisation and 
strategies after 1900, a development that resulted in more effective employer 
advocacy within arbitration.92 Wood, in particular, analyses insightfully the 
role of ‘imperial capitalism’, especially in regard to the Blackball strike as it 
revolved around G. G. Stead.93 There was an emerging militant managerial 
elite among Canterbury employers and the directors of the mining companies 
who lived in Christchurch and beyond. For his part, Richardson points to 
the role of Stead’s successor, Sir George Clifford, chairman of the Blackball 
Coal Company and a Canterbury run holder.94 The Blackball strike is a 
good site to examine urban and rural property owners’ stance on workers, 
especially coalminers. McCullough’s experience provides a more explicit 
view of the employers’ new doctrine of efficiency, which coincided with a 
more aggressively anti-union position.
 Scott, a Dunedin warehouseman and the secretary of the Otago Employers’ 
Association (OEA), spearheaded an employers’ strategy that mirrored the 
Independent Political Labour League’s strategy of putting McCullough on the 
arbitration bench. Scott could be described as an industrial employer rather 
than a ‘craft employer’. In July 1904 Scott proposed the uniform conduct of 
cases before the Arbitration Court, and the OEA resolved not to voluntarily 
furnish the Labour Department with any industrial information. The OEA 
wanted to replace Samuel Brown, the sitting employers’ representative on 
the Arbitration Court, with their own secretary. The association considered 
Brown’s manner abrasive, finding that he had a ‘craft employer’ mentality 
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unsuited to the demands of new employers and a new century. The 
Canterbury Employers’ Association (CEA) supported Brown, however, and 
so, in the interests of unity, Scott relinquished his campaign.  From August 
1904 the OEA directed its secretary to conduct all disputes where practicable, 
and at the end of 1905 Scott resigned his position on the Conciliation Board 
to concentrate on conducting cases before the Arbitration Court.95 Scott’s 
triumphs acting for the OEA led employers throughout New Zealand to seek 
his advocacy. Indeed, hiring out their secretary became a lucrative trade for 
the OEA.
 By February 1908, Scott was the most experienced employers’ advocate 
in New Zealand. He had conducted 142 disputes before the court and had 
presided over 187 conferences between employers and workers.96 During 
July and August 1908, for instance, Scott followed the court through Otago 
and Southland, conducting ten major disputes on behalf of the employers, 
defending many of the cases for enforcement and presiding over most of 
the conferences between workers and employers.97 The press sympathised 
with what must have been an ‘arduous and trying’ time for a lone advocate, 
and even Scott admitted in private correspondence to being consumed by 
his task: ‘I have got coal on the brain and the poor down trodden mines 
disturb my dreams.’98
 The employers’ tactics in the Arbitration Court became a major concern 
for McCullough as Workers’ Representative. He became as concerned with 
Scott’s advocacy on behalf of employers as he was with internal union 
factionalism. McCullough noted in his diary after meeting Scott, at about 
the same time he met the Red Feds for the first time in February 1908:
 I went around with Pryor [president of the New Zealand Employers’ 
Federation] to Scott’s office and am more than ever convinced after 
seeing them at work and the methodical manner in which his office 
is conducted that until such time as we adopt their methods, have our 
well paid brainy officials to conduct our cases for us, men who make 
the presentation of cases and the conducting of our business the work 
of their lives we are handicapped to such an extent that we cannot win 
. . . . I read a pamphlet by Scott delivered at an employers’ meeting 
and proving him to be a man thoughtful and careful and displaying a 
knowledge of the court and the history of the Court’s procedure and 
the Act itself that I have never met any worker displaying . . . .99
Well might McCullough have pondered Scott’s constant presence in the 
courtrooms of the travelling Arbitration Court. From the time Scott had 
been selected from fifty-one applicants for the secretarial position in 1904, 
he had embarked on a recruiting crusade for the OEA. He had provided 
the association with its office, its furniture and its typist. In just four years 
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he turned the Otago office into a ‘verifiable bureau of information for the 
Dominion’. 100
 Most importantly, Scott provided the OEA with a successful arbitration 
strategy. Briefly, there were two facets to Scott’s strategy: first, to organise 
industry-based trade associations of employers in important industries; and 
second, to take consistent and ably conducted cases to the Arbitration Court 
on a dominion principle rather than, as previously, making ad hoc agreements 
with individual unions.
 This ‘Otago strategy’ was in keeping with a growing employer consensus 
on the need for coordinated organisation. For instance, in 1899 the CEA 
had reorganised to form Master Trades’ Associations, a Parliamentary 
Bills Committee and an Industrial Disputes Committee.101 It advised other 
associations to follow its example. Two major national employers’ coalitions 
were created in response to general employer sentiment: the Employers’ 
Federation in 1902; and the Parliamentary Vigilance Committee in 1903 
to organise employers’ submissions to the Labour Bills Committee. From 
1906 these two national bodies, which had a high public profile, were led 
by another Otago employer and Scott’s confrere, William Pryor. However, 
the less obvious but arguably more important employer offensive was that 
orchestrated in the Arbitration Court by Scott himself.
 From his experience as an advocate in industrial disputes and as the 
acting employer-member of the arbitration bench when Sam Brown was 
unavailable, Scott found his major obstacle to be ‘stupid agreements 
entered into by employers without a full knowledge of their effects’.102 The 
OEA relied on the larger companies for financial support and influence. 
To counter worksite agreements, Scott built upon the OEA’s relationship 
with these companies to form important trade associations. In particular, 
Scott organised the local Otago and Southland Associations of Woollen 
Manu facturers in 1906 and the Otago Coalmine Owners in 1907, both of 
which used him and his office for their secretariat, as had the previously 
established Otago Sheepowners’ Union from 1904. Scott being the Otago 
Clothiers’ and Drapers’ Associations’ representative helped him marshal the 
woollen manufacturers. Similarly, Pryor’s former role representing the Coal 
Merchants’ and Carriers’ Association aided in rallying the coalmine owners. 
Further, the OEA had deliberately undertaken to deepen its entente cordiale 
with certain farming interests after 1904. Regular consultation resulted in 
regional agreement as to the rates employers would offer the unions.
 McCullough joined the Arbitration Court at the turning point in Scott’s 
campaign to coordinate employers locally and nationally. Scott realised that 
his strategy infuriated the unions, which now openly condemned the court’s 
decisions. He counselled employers to be cautious so as not to jeopardise 
public confidence in the court in which he was planning to win and warned 
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them against making the ‘first attack in the workplace’. The employers’ 
new and now national offensive was being discussed freely between two 
of its leaders, Scott and Pryor: ‘It is manifest that the Federation from this 
time on will require to keep a stiff back and as you say show its teeth as 
legislators and Judges alike seem prepared to go as far as they can or until 
the employers squeal. We shall have to squeal oftener.’103 Consequently, 
the tone of the Arbitration Court hearings was changing. Employers and 
workers in the early years of the Arbitration Court hearings had appeared 
to share a consensus; certainly, the proceedings were amicable ‘with parties 
congratulating each other at the conclusion upon the fine spirit and excellent 
presentation displayed by the opposition’.104 Overseas visitors had been struck 
with the ‘good temper displayed by all parties’. By contrast, in 1908, Scott 
found the presentation skills of union advocates feeble. He was convinced 
that there was no union advocate competent to win the important Otago 
cases and advised mine managers to put off making agreements with workers 
until after the Arbitration Court case had been heard. In that forum, most 
employers had ‘everything to gain and nothing to lose’.105
 McCullough was inclined to agree with Scott’s assessment of union 
advocacy. He sharply criticised incompetent or ineffectual union 
advocates and especially those who addressed the court ‘as if on their 
soapboxes’. McCullough regarded as even more perturbing the increasingly 
uncomplimentary comments made by his benchmates and employers’ 
advocates about the working class. The new managerial elite and their 
represent atives, such as Scott, had a new perception of labour based on 
their own criteria of efficiency and capability.
 McCullough’s experience taught him that union leaders were reluctant to 
participate in the arbitration process, and consequently, their counter-evidence 
in court was usually very poor. Lack of effective presentation and the 
consequent poor results, McCullough believed, alienated union advocates 
from the Arbitration Court. Certainly, there was no workers’ advocate of 
the calibre of Scott. This inattention to presentation was unfortunate for, as 
Noel Woods has argued, the court’s procedures were being consolidated to 
emphasise formal evidence.106 Sim disparaged formal evidence presented by 
unionists, because, in general, it was not supported by either well researched 
documentation or by a concern for precedent. Henry Broadhead, secretary 
of the CEA from 1899 and a member of the Canterbury Conciliation 
Board, shared the judges’ assessment of the factual poverty of the workers’ 
evidence: ‘It practically revolves itself into something like this: “We want 
higher wages because the present wages are too low, and are not so high 
as in other parts of the colony; we want shorter hours, because the present 
hours are too long.” Or the union may emphasize the fact that the cost 
of living has increased.’107 McCullough claimed that the court was biased 
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against workers and manipulated by experienced employer advocates. The 
best defence he could see for the workers was to emulate the employers’ 
tactics and beat them at their own game.
 McCullough sought to steep himself in the workplace practices of a host 
of different trades and occupations and to convince workers of the need to 
defend themselves in the Arbitration Court. He set about encouraging the 
more effective union secretaries, like Arthur Rosser, to act for less well-
represented unions. Eventually, he organised mock Conciliation Court and 
Arbitration Court hearings for union advocates. He persuaded members 
of the Canterbury Industrial Presidents’ and Secretaries’ Associations, for 
instance, to role-play in mock disputes such as the ‘Miners’ versus the 
‘Colliery Owners’ Association’, with McCullough acting as judge.108
 Unlike the miners, McCullough had already run up against the likes of 
Sir George Clifford and George T. Booth, who were in partnership with 
the Scotts and Pryors of the employers’ federation. From 1906 the Farmers’ 
Advocate carried articles denouncing the rabid teachings of the Socialist 
Party and prophesying the coming danger posed by the black cloud of 
socialism.109 Such warnings were accompanied by threats that farmers would 
turn from labour-intensive wheat to sheep farming if urban unionists like 
McCullough continued their campaign to bring farmers into the arbitration 
system. In August 1906 the North Canterbury provincial executive of the 
Farmers’ Union affiliated to the Canterbury Employers’ Association.
 McCullough’s diaries and papers are full of comments on employ ers’ 
activities, such as the presence of the farmers in the courtroom to attend 
the Christchurch General Labourers’ dispute. For instance, he noted in 1908 
that ‘the Farmers were there in force: Jones, Evans; Acland & a number 
of other big guns’.110 McCullough was candid about his feelings over the 
judge wanting to exclude the farming sector from the award. After the farm 
labourers’ case in July 1908, Henry Acland and David Evans were toasted at 
the CEA annual conference. In the most extreme public statements to that 
date, the employers declared that there was an insidious ‘civil war’ being 
fought in New Zealand between ‘right minded New Zealanders and Socialist 
union agitators’.111 Acland and Evans told the city employers that they had 
fought the farm labourers and their urban leaders in the way they had 
because their demands were largely politic al. They protested vociferously at 
the prostitution of the Arbitration Court for political purposes and promised 
to do battle with these union agitators. McCullough was convinced that 
all employers, the farmers in particular, were conspiring against the farm 
labourers.
 Of course, one runs the risk of overemphasising the battle. McCullough’s 
conspiracy thesis, like the employers’, had its limitations. The real strength of 
the employers lay in their organisation and their capable officials. In contrast 
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to the trade union organisations such as the Canterbury Trades and Labour 
Council, the employers’ affiliations specialised in their roles: the employers’ 
associations acted as the political watch-dogs; the chambers of commerce 
focused on trade issues; and the industrial associations concentrated on 
municipal philanthropy.
 Yet for all their apparent unity, there were major tensions within their 
ranks. The tariff issue, for example, revealed the essential incompatibility 
of urban and rural, producer and manufacturer interests. The industrialists 
and manufacturers wished to build up a tariff wall, an idea the farmers 
did not support. This division was a major stumbling block to a proposed 
amalgamation of Canterbury employers in 1910. While it was difficult for 
the small employer groups to mount a unified front, their disagreements 
were less public and certainly less divisive than those within trade union 
ranks. What McCullough feared as he read in the CEA’s annual report in 
1908 was that the employers were organising a ‘well-disciplined and solid 
phalanx’, which the labour movement was ill-equipped to counter.112
 McCullough’s position on Blackball was based on two aspects of his 
experience, then. First, the miners, in common with most other trade unions, 
did not present well in court. They did not argue their case convincingly. 
McCullough did not record his view of the miners in court in March 1908. 
However, when the Blackball miners sought a new award in November 1908, 
McCullough was ‘disgusted with Hickeys attempt to cross-examine W Leach 
Manager of the Mine’: ‘I pleaded with him at the luncheon adjournment to 
leave him alone: but he continued to examine him for another hour each 
question making matters worse for the Union.’113
 Secondly, McCullough had dealt with Christchurch employers like 
G.G. Stead, and he knew the connections between them and the West Coast 
mines. His experience led him to be sceptical of the chances of success for 
the miners’ militant strategies. He was concerned that they were playing into 
the hands of the employers. He wrote to Tom Paul in January 1908: ‘[The 
employers] have the impression that the “Miners Federation” are looking for 
a fight and I know many of the Bosses would like to fight them at once; 
while they are in their infancy and before they attain power and influence 
which such a large federation must exercise if wisely governed.’114 A number 
of urban socialists like McCullough did not oppose industrial militancy 
in principle; they disagreed with its being squandered without profit for 
socialists.
Women’s role: limits of the representation strategy
Finally, a third characteristic of the historiography on Blackball is that little 
has been written on women’s role.115 We know a great deal of the women in 
the 1890 strike, the 1912 Waihi Strike, the 1913 Great Strike and the 1951 
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Waterfront dispute.116 We know about the activism of Blackball women in 
the name of unionism at other times. For instance, in 1914 two married 
women were fined £10 and £2.10.0 respectively for ‘assault and hurling 
epithets at members of the new union at Blackball’.117 Richardson has written 
of Blackball women in the interwar period, including Ida Galbraith, Sophie 
Doyle and especially Annie Balderstone, a leading member of the Communist 
Party in Blackball in the 1920s.118 We have no comparable work, however, 
on the women at Blackball in 1908, or indeed at other West Coast mines 
at the same time.
 Women were involved in the strike of course. Women and children lined 
the main Blackball street, cheered when Hickey was arrested and made a 
triumphal procession through the town on 28 April 1908 to jail at Ngahere.119 
More women and children than men were dependent on the union funds 
during the strike. The schedule listing the members of the union liable 
to pay the fine the court imposed on the Blackball Miners’ Union on 12 
May 1908 lists over 160 miners’ names.120 Olssen notes that 40 miners 
had left Blackball by the end of the April ‘but most of the married men 
remained’ and of course their wives.121 At first the union decided to pay 
strikers £1 10s a week, with 10s for a wife and 5s for each child, but these 
rates soon strained the union’s resources and were halved. From the strike 
fund of £1603, the Blackball union made eleven relief payments covering 
seven of the eleven weeks of the strike, to 104 miners, 46 women and 111 
children.122 It is difficult to write about women’s role in 1908 compared to 
other strikes, because there was no women’s committee in 1908, the main 
source of women’s views during the 1912, 1913 and 1951 strikes. Part of 
the problem, too, is that the strike was a relatively small one.
 Novelists rather than historians have pioneered in representing women’s 
role in the strike.123 There may not be a Blackball Annie, but we have a 
Denniston Rose.124 Walter Rogers, secretary of the Blackball Miners’ Union 
in Eric Beardsley’s novel, Blackball ’08, has a wife, Elizabeth (nee Harris) 
Rogers, and a daughter, Rose Rogers.125 The character Elizabeth was a 
socialist like her husband. She had met Walter at a Clarion rally, joined the 
Clarion Fellowship and came out with Ranstead’s 200 Clarionettes. Theirs 
was a partnership. She tells Paddy Webb: ‘the women, Paddy, the women. 
They can be as good socialists as the men – yes and probably a damned sight 
better.’126 Beardsley modelled his fictional Elizabeth on Annie Balderstone.127 
Another fictional figure, Mary Scobie in Jenny Pattrick’s Denniston Rose, 
converts to unionism and perhaps socialism. Mary was the daughter and 
granddaughter of English Midlands miners.128
 Historians lack the artistic license that fiction writers exercise in 
inventing an Elizabeth Rodgers or a Mary Scobie. Given extant sources 
and the absence of any oral history, we may never know much more about 
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Blackball women’s activism in 1908. This gap in the historical record raises 
an interesting problem for work based on a relational model, the approach 
that a more balanced view of the strike derives from having as wide a 
range of views as possible. What happens when we have no evidence of the 
women’s viewpoint? Finding a more balanced view of the 1908 Blackball 
strike requires more than simply gathering the range of available perceptions 
regarding the strike.
 Recording the urban socialists’ view of 1908 partially redresses the lack 
of women’s views. When McCullough first talked to the miners during the 
case brought against them in the Arbitration Court for illegally striking in 
March 1908, he ‘urged upon them the necessity in the interests of the women 
& kids that they should patch up & get back to work’.129 McCullough’s 
view may well have been widely held. Indeed, sympathy for the miners’ 
wives and children motivated urban radicals to support the strike fund, even 
when they did not support the strike itself. West Coast miners contributed 
half of the Blackball strike fund, with the Runanga State Miners’ Union 
single-handedly providing 12% of the total raised. Half the contributions 
came from other trade union and socialist organisations.130 Among the latter 
contributors to the strike fund, we find the Wellington Typographers, the 
Christchurch Tailors’ and Pressers’ Union and the Dunedin Political Labour 
League, associations that were never supporters of the Red Feds and yet 
did support the strike fund, ‘for the sake of the women and children’. By 
a majority of one in a ballot, the Wellington Typographers agreed to ‘vote 
£10 immediately, and £5 per month, to the women and children of the 
Blackball strikers’.131 For that matter, the Denniston, Tyneside and Brunner 
Miners’ Unions and the Westport Labourers’ Union all decided that ‘they 
had no sympathy with the Blackball strikers but, in order to prevent their 
wives and children suffering, it was resolved to call on a five per cent even 
on the men’s wages’.132 Similarly, when Dave Pritchard traveled around New 
Zealand in March, trying to raise strike funds and support funds, Kaitanaga 
colliers raised £2 in sympathy ‘for the women and children’. In motivating 
contributions to the strike fund, the women were pivotal to the prosecution 
and the success of the strike.
Conclusion
While we may add the urban radicals and the employers to the story of 
Blackball, the main obstacle to adding women is that the ‘primacy of politics’ 
still prevails in its historiography. The primacy of politics approach stresses 
politics over socio-economic class-based determinants and other expressions 
of class. As Neville Kirk suggested, this weighting of politics has led to 
an ‘imbalance of treatment and fragmentation of subject matter’.133 What 
happened in Blackball in 1908, as is increasingly recognised, was not just 
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a matter of politics. Economics, the weather and contingency all played a 
part. If there had been a depression, the miners might not have been able 
to raise the resources with which to wage a strike. If the Tyneside mine 
had not flooded, the employers might not have settled and thus encouraged 
the Miners’ Federation. In the last analysis, the strike was less about any 
particular grievance or long-standing concern. It was altogether more 
ambitious: it was about the rising expectations of workers who wanted 
something more than the industrial relations system was delivering. It was 
about aspiration as much as ideology.
 The cost of living contributed to the Blackball strike, but it was a 
necessary rather than a sufficient reason.134 Lack of agreement in the 
movement regarding the cost of living exacerbated industrial relations after 
1907. Most unions argued that the cost of living between the 1890s and 
the 1900s had increased by 30-40%, while wages had only been increased 
10%.135 McCullough was inclined to agree with these figures and used them 
as the basis for urging wage increases. The employers, however, rejected 
the figures: they summoned land agents, butchers and grocers to testify that 
prices had not increased.136 Employers’ advocates maintained that claims of 
an increase in the cost of living resulted from the inflated expectations of 
workers who wanted to live in homes with ‘tubs, a copper and a bath’ and 
to afford to go to Wonderland and to the races.137 Assenting to neither view, 
the judge of the watersiders’ case asserted that the cost of living between 
1894 and 1908 had not risen by more than 20% and that wage increases had 
largely compensated for this increase.138 How he arrived at his opinion is 
not elucidated. Indeed, in another case he argued that the evidence showed 
that the cost of living had actually dropped between 1905 and 1908.139 
A consideration of the cost of living and the family economy would put 
women into the story of Blackball ’08. While wages were high at Blackball, 
so too were expenses, and living conditions were remote and poor.
 Adding a wider range of perspectives certainly helps us understand 
the 1908 Blackball strike. We are alerted, for instance, to the extent to 
which socialist Red Fed coalminers have dominated the history of 1908. 
Consideration of the socialist urban position, represented by McCullough, 
undermines the moderate/militant dichotomy. Blackball is a case study 
allowing us to tease out the range of ideologies, the employers’ position 
and the socio-cultural as well as the political and ideological aspects of 
the strike. In the decade before the first World War, there were a variety 
of discourses and discussions, not just on the left, about how New Zealand 
society was going to be managed. As well as adding new points of view, 
thickening and stirring the existing narrative, a more thorough-going re-
vision of Blackball, comes from a systematic criticism of the ‘primacy of 
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politics’. To write an account of Blackball 1908, concentrating on women, 
without the onus of politics, would be truly revolutionary social history.
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